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ARGUMENT 
1. The Idaho Session Laws represent the official record of the statutes enacted in 
each session of the Idaho Legislature. 
The primary issue that is presented in this appeal remains whether the district court erred 
in refusing to give the full force and effect of law to section 5 of 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 
as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331 (hereinafter "the 2011 amendments"). The 
district court's decision was predicated upon the position that only the provisions of Idaho Code 
are "statutes" as it relates to this matter. (See R. p. 185). That position is not supported by Idaho 
law. 
The term statute is defined as, "A law passed by a legislative body; specif., legislation 
enacted by any lawmaking body, including legislatures, administrative boards, and municipal 
courts." STATUTE, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Idaho Session Laws, including the 
2011 amendments in their full form (2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331) clearly meet this 
definition. 
Furthermore, the enactment and operation of laws in the State of Idaho are governed by 
Idaho Code Title 67, Chapter 5. The requirement for the compilation of the laws passed in a 
given session is found in this chapter, 
Each act of the legislature shall, on becoming a law, be designated as "Chapter .... 
of the Laws of .... ," adding its chapter number and the year in which it becomes a 
law; and in respect to each session of the legislature, the laws enacted at such 
session shall be numbered consecutively in the order, as nearly as may be 
practicable, in which they become laws, each year having its own independent 
series of consecutive chapter numbers. 
Idaho Code § 67-506. Thereafter, the laws passed by the Idaho Legislature during a given 
legislative session are printed in a volume entitled the Idaho Session Laws. Idaho Code § 67-
904. As a result the operational statutes of the State of Idaho are in fact the Idaho Session Laws. 
Despite the fact that the Session Laws are in fact the official statutes of the State of Idaho, 
Peterson's argument essentially requires that each individual section of Idaho Code must be read 
in isolation from the legislation that enacted it. Both the State and Peterson have previously 
acknowledged that, "[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
the applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz v. Priest River 
Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333,336,870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994) (citing, In re: Permit No. 36-
7200,121 Idaho 819, 823,828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992) and Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Camm'n, 
97 Idaho 917, 920, 556 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1976)). 
Peterson's proposed application of the 2011 amendments would render the emergency 
and retroactivity clause found in Section 5 utterly without meaning and superfluous. Where this 
Court has previously stated, "in determining the ordinary meaning of a statute effect must be 
given to all the words ... , so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 
143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006), Peterson's position is not supported by Idaho law. 
Peterson's statement that the retroactivity clause should be read to mean as applying to, '''any' 
judgment for child support 'that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995' [as long as the 
lien created by § 10-1110 and applied by § 10-1111 has not yet expired]," (Respondent's Brief, p. 
10), would make the retroactivity clause entirely illusory. This interpretation would protect 
Peterson, as is her want, because it really means the court could renew "any judgment for child 
support that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995 as long as that judgment has not 
yet expired." Any perceived inconsistency between the retroactivity clause and the remainder of 
the amending provisions should be resolved in favor of allowing retroactivity as, "a specific 
statute [or provision] will control over a general or vague statute [or provision] when the two are 
in conflict." Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980). 
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The Idaho Session Laws are the official statutes of the State of Idaho. The Session Laws 
at issue in this matter include a specific retroactivity clause set forth in Section 5 thereof. A 
comprehensive application of those Session Laws must effectuate all intended provisions of the 
legislation including the retroactivity clause. Finally, that application must provide more than 
just illusory effect to the retroactivity clause in accordance with general principles of statutory 
interpretation. 
2. Idaho appellate courts have historically referenced Idaho Session Laws for their 
binding authority when analyzing the statutes of the State of Idaho. 
In her response brief Ms. Peterson only addresses one of the cases cited by the State 
dealing with the authority of the Idaho Session Laws. As set forth in the State's Opening Brief 
this Court utilized an uncodified provision from 1996 Idaho Session Laws § 385 in its decision to 
retroactively apply a statutory change in Union Warehouse and Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. 
Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660, 669,917 P.2d 1300, 1309 (1996). 
This Court has likewise relied upon uncodified provisions from the Idaho Session Laws 
In analyzing other statutes, particularly in the area of determining effective dates and 
retroactivity. In 1968, this Court looked to an uncodified provision of 1963 Idaho Session Laws 
§ 269 in determining that the legislature had not intended an amendment to be applied 
retroactively. "The legislature, in setting the effective date of the new statute, demonstrated an 
intent that it not be given a retrospective effect." Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 
Idaho 499, 504, 445 P.2d 720, 725 (1968). 
This Court once again looked to a clause in the Idaho Session Laws in determining that a 
gasoline tax increase could not take effect immediately upon passage on an emergency basis in 
V-I Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Idaho 140, 143,559 P.2d 756, 759 (1977). This pattern has 
continued as recently as 2005 when this Court again looked not at an Idaho Code provision, but 
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rather the implementing legislation found in the Idaho Session Laws in once again concluding 
that the Legislature had not provided a clear intention that a newly enacted statute be applied 
retroactively. State ex reI. Wasden v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd, 141 Idaho 102, 105, 106 P.3d 
428, 431 (2005). 
While only Union Warehouse actually involved a statute with a retroactivity provision, in 
all four of the above cases this Court evaluated the retroactivity issue by reviewing the enacting 
session law. The final version of the enacting statute relating to the 2011 amendments is clear as 
to the Idaho Legislature's intent that the amendments be applied retroactively similarly to the 
legislation in Union Warehouse. The retroactivity language in question states, 
[T]his act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval, and 
retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply to all orders currently being enforced by the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Child Support Program such that any Idaho 
judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 1995, may be 
renewed on or before December 30,2011. 
2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104, Section 5 as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. The 
legislature's intent was clearly spelled out indicating that judgments which would be expired but 
for the amendments could be renewed on or before December 30, 2011. 
The district court erred in refusing to consider the authority of the Idaho Session Laws in 
deciding this matter. The 2011 Legislature expressed a clear and unambiguous intent that the 
2011 amendments be applied retroactively and revive expired support obligations such as Ms. 
Peterson's. This Court should effectuate that express intent and reinstate the renewed judgment 
entered by the magistrate court. 
A. This Court has previously utilized authority from the Idaho Session 
Laws to revive a lapsed statute of limitations and allow a paternity 
action that ultimately required a parent to provide financial 
support for a child during minority. 
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The Court utilized the authority from the Idaho Session Laws to allow for the filing of a 
paternity action as well as to enforce the paternal father's obligation to provide financial support 
to his child during her minority in Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 446, 915 P.2d 6, 8 
(1996). In Henderson, a mother sought a paternity judgment and child support order against 
Smith for Henderson's daughter, born in 1981. Id. Henderson's action was allowed by two 
amendments extending the existing statute of limitations on paternity actions, which were passed 
in 1985 and 1986. Id 
Smith argued that under the law prior to the 1985 and 1986 amendments, Henderson's 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 448, 915 P.2d at 10. Smith also argued that 
the legislature, "cannot revive a cause of action after the limitations period has lapsed and 
expired under the pre-amended limitations provision." Id. 
The magistrate court disagreed with Smith, declared him as the father, and ordered child 
support payments; the district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision. Id. at 446,915 P.2d 
at 8. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions concluding that Henderson's 
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id. In issuing that decision the Court 
specifically stated Smith's assertion that the legislature lacked authority to revive the paternity 
claim following the expiration of the previously existing statute of limitations was without merit. 
Id. at 444, 915 P .2d at 10. Of note in its Henderson decision, the Court repetitively cited 1985 
and 1986 Idaho Session Laws as its source of authority. Id. 
The passage of the 1985 and 1986 Amendments by the Idaho Legislature permitted the 
mother in Henderson to bring a claim for paternity and child support. Likewise, the 2011 
Amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110, and 10-1111 by the Idaho Legislature allowed 
Appellant to bring his claim for seek the renewed child support judgment. 
5 
Though the statute of limitations in Henderson was expired under prior Idaho statute, the 
retroactivity provision of the 1985 and 1986 Amendments successfully revived the lapsed statute 
of limitations. Similarly, though the judgment lien in the instant case was expired under prior 
law, the 2011 Amendments with the attendant retroactivity provision successfully revived the 
lapsed judgment lien. 
In Henderson, Smith argued that the legislature did not have authority to revive a cause 
of action after the limitations period expired under the pre-amended limitations provision. Here, 
Peterson argues that the legislature cannot revive the cause of action to renew her delinquent 
support obligation since the limitations period expired under the limitations provisions in place 
prior to the 2011 Amendments. 
Yet the Henderson Court allowed the mother's claim due to the expreSSIOn of the 
legislature's intent to retroactively apply the amendment as seen in 1986 Idaho Session Law. 
This Court should likewise find that the retroactivity provision of the 2011 amendments allows 
the State to pursue the renewed child support judgment against Ms. Peterson. 
Similar to the Henderson Court's holdings, this Court should also hold that the 2011 
Amendments, with the retroactivity provision, successfully revived the lapsed support judgment. 
This Court should reverse the district court and reinstate the judgment for Ms. Peterson's unpaid 
child support obligations. 
B. In 1998, this Court utilized the authority of the Idaho Session Laws 
to further promote the public policy of enforcing a parent's 
obligation to provide financial support to his child during 
minority. 
The Court again relied upon authority from the Idaho Session Laws to enforce a parent's 
obligation to provide financial support to his or her children during their minority in Stonecipher 
v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 733, 963 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1998). In Stonecipher, Dwight 
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Stonecipher contested a child support arrearage judgment in favor of his ex-wife, Donna 
Stonecipher. Id. While Dwight never made a payment on the court-ordered child support 
obligation beginning in June 1979, he asserted that any accrued arrearages greater than six years 
prior to Donna's motion were barred by the statute of limitations found in Idaho Code § 5-245. 
Id. Yet the Court noted that in 1988, the Idaho Legislature expanded the statute of limitation to 
allow for collection of "child support arrearages accrued under a support order within five years 
after the child reaches the age of majority". Id. at 735, 963 P.2d at 1172. In 1995, the Idaho 
legislature added one sentence of clarifying language to Idaho Code § 5-245 and provided a 
non-exhaustive list of terms encompassing an "action or proceeding." Id. 
Donna filed a motion for contempt and entry of judgment settling Dwight's arrearages 
amount in March 1995. Id. at 733. The magistrate court held that only those arrearages accrued 
prior to July 1, 1982, were barred under Idaho Code § 5-245 and thereby awarded judgment for 
the remaining arrearages in favor of Donna. Id. 
When he appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, Dwight contended that the magistrate 
should not have relied upon the extended statute of limitations since Donna's motion for a show 
cause order fell outside the statute until its 1995 amendment. Id. at 735. Dwight claimed 
Donna's motion, did not qualify under the statute as an "action or proceeding" until it was 
expressly added in 1995. Id. 
In considering the 1995 amendment, the Court cited 1995 Idaho Session Laws in 
determining that the amendments simply clarified the existing law. Id. citing 1995 Idaho Session 
Laws, ch. 264 § 1. Since Donna's order to show cause specifically fell within the list of terms 
qualifying as an "action or proceeding," and since it was filed within Idaho Code § 5-245's 
limitation period, the Court held that the arrearages judgment was properly awarded by the 
7 
magistrate. Id. at 735. Granting Donna's judgment for arrearages promoted the public policy of 
enforcing a parent's obligation to financially support their children during minority. Id. at 736. 
Dwight Stonecipher hoped to evade paying a large portion of the support he owed even 
though he never made a payment on a court-ordered child support obligation. Peterson likewise 
contests her child support arrearages judgment without having paid the court-ordered child 
support obligation. Similar to Dwight's contention that the magistrate should not have extended 
the statute of limitation on his obligation under Idaho Code § 5-245, Peterson contends that the 
magistrate should not have revived the lapsed support judgment on her obligation under the 2011 
amendments. 
The Stonecipher Court, relying in part on the authority of a 1995 Idaho session law, ruled 
that Donna's order qualified as an "action or proceeding" and was filed within Idaho Code § 5-
245's limitation period and found the arrearages judgment was proper. This Court should 
similarly find that Appellant's action was filed within the retroactivity window allowed by the 
2011 amendments, and that the arrearages judgment was properly awarded by the magistrate. 
Furthermore, where the Stonecipher Court found that Donna's judgment for arrearages promoted 
the public policy of enforcing a parent's obligation to financially support children during their 
minority; this Court should likewise affirm the original judgment for arrearages in order to 
promote the same public policy. 
The Court in Henderson relied upon the authority of 1985 and 1986 Idaho Session Law 
to allow for the filing of a paternity action, after the lapse of a previous statute of limitations, 
ultimately leading to the enforcement of a parent's obligation to provide financial support to his 
child during the child's minority. The Court in Stonecipher also relied on the authority of 1995 
Idaho Session Law to enforce a parent's obligation to provide financial support to his child 
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during the child's minority. This Court, using the authority of 2011 Idaho Session Law, should 
enforce the Peterson's obligation to provide financial support to her child by overturning the 
district court decision and reinstating the magistrate court's renewal of the Peterson's unpaid 
support obligation. 
3. Peterson ignores established Idaho case law, misinterprets and misapplies Idaho 
case law, and attempts to rely on inapplicable foreign authority to try and 
convince this Court that a vested right exists in an expired statute of limitations. 
In her attempt to establish a "vested right" in withholding financial support from her 
child, Peterson ignores established Idaho case law which conclusively states that no vested right 
exists in an expired statute of limitations. Peterson also misinterprets and misapplies Idaho case 
law in her failed attempts to find a "vested right" in an expired statute of limitations. Finally, 
Peterson places inordinate weight upon a distinguishable Utah case to assert the aforementioned 
"vested ri ght." 
A. Peterson ignores the Hecla Mining Company holding that an expired 
statute of limitations does not endow a vested right. 
Peterson's continued assertion that she has a vested right in an expired statute of 
limitations directly contradicts established Idaho case law. In Hecla Min. Co. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 108 Idaho 147,697 P.2d 1161 (1985), Hecla Mining argued that a previously expired 
three-year statute of limitations should apply to its case. Id. at 149. The Idaho State Tax 
Commission argued that a subsequently enacted but longer statute of limitation should apply. Id. 
at 149. In agreeing with Idaho State Tax Commission, the Court stated: 
"The shelter of a statute of limitations has never been regarded as a fundamental 
right, and the lapse of a statute of limitations does not endow a citizen with a 
vested property right in immunity from suit." Starks v. s.E. Rykoff and Co., 673 
F .2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a lapse of time has not invested a party 
with title to real or personal property, a state legislature may extend a lapsed 
statute of limitations without violating the fourteenth amendment, regardless of 
whether the effect is seen as creating or reviving a barred claim." Id. These 
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propositions are true because statutes of limitations involve matters of remedy, 
not destruction of rights. Cf Mitchell v Agents of State, 105 Idaho 491, 423, 670 
P.2d 520 (1983). 
108 Idaho at 150,697 P.2d at 1164. 
Furthermore, as highlighted earlier in this brief this Court has also previously stated, 
Smith argues that the statutory amendments to Idaho Code § 7-1107 do not 
permit Henderson to pursue this paternity claim on the ground that the legislature 
cannot revive a cause of action after the limitations period has lapsed and expired 
under the pre-amended limitations provisions. We disagree. 
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 448,915 P.2d 6,10 (1996). 
Peterson, similar to Hecla Mining Company and Smith, argues that an older statute of 
limitations prior to the 2011 Amendments should apply to this case. Appellant, similar to the 
Idaho State Tax Commission and Henderson, argues that the more current statute of limitations 
of the 2011 Amendments should apply to this case. This Court, like the Hecla Min. Co. and 
Henderson courts, should reiterate Peterson does not have a vested right resulting from an 
expired statute of limitations. The shelter of a statute of limitations is not a fundamental right, 
and the expiration of a statute of limitations did not endow Peterson with a vested property right 
in immunity from this suit for her unpaid child support obligation. Moreover, the Henderson 
Court held the Idaho Legislature has authority to revive a support claim following the expiration 
of a previously existing statute of limitations. 
B. Peterson misinterprets and misapplies Hidden Springs and its 
progenitors in her failed attempt to establish a vested right. 
Peterson attempts to cite the binding authority of Idaho case law while simultaneously 
misinterpreting and misapplying it. For instance, Peterson uses the citation, "However, it is also 
the rule in Idaho legislation that retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or 
already existing rights" to define "vested rights" to mean "already existing rights." In the Matter 
10 
of Hidden Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 624, 636 P.2d 745, 746 (1981). 
However, Peterson fails to address the immediately preceding statement from Hidden Springs in 
which the Court stated, "It is the general rule in Idaho that a statute should not be applied 
retroactively in the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect." 102 Idaho at 624, 636 
P.2d at 746. This clear statement of law demonstrates the principle failing in Peterson's 
argument, simply none of the cases on which she attempts to rely dealt with legislation 
containing an express statement of retroactive application from the legislature. 
Like in Hidden Springs the Court in Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining was evaluating whether a 
law, which was not made expressly retroactive by the legislature, could nevertheless be applied 
to a case arising from operative facts that predated the enactment of the statute in question: 
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is 
applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is retroactive only when it 
operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have 
been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage. 
93 Idaho 169, 172,457P.2d408,411 (1969). 
Neither the Hidden Springs court nor the Frisbie court would apply to Peterson's 
situation, due to the fact that in the present case the legislature has provided an express statement 
of retroactivity, which was not the case in either Hidden Springs or Frisbie. 
Peterson cites Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690,448 P.2d 977 (1969) as a further source of 
how subsequent legislation cannot negatively affect "vested rights." 92 Idaho at 693, 448 P.2d 
980. However, a complete reading of Engen indicates it is tied to its specific factual situation 
and is readily distinguishable from the instant case. The Engen court evaluates whether Engen, a 
retired policeman who paid into a pension system with 25 years of continuous service, could be 
negatively affected by a legislative act after his retirement. 92 Idaho at 693, 448 P.2d 980. After 
setting forth the provision cited by Peterson the Engen Court goes on to state, "This follows from 
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the compensatory nature of pension plans." 92 Idaho at 693, 448 P.2d at 980. The court found 
that the retroactive statute in question "did not change the existing 'rights and conditions' of 
respondent; nor did it change the 'legal effect' of any previous event." Id. at 695, 448 P.2d at 
982. The specific "compensatory" nature of a statutory retirement benefit would be seen as 
vesting title to personal property, however, as stated in Hecla Min. Co. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm 'n, 108 Idaho 147, 697 P.2d 1161, the lapsing of a statute of limitations does not vest one 
with a right in the immunity from suit. 108 Idaho at 150, 697 P .2d at 1164. 
Also, in Engen, the right Engen sought to enforce did not accrue until after the enactment 
of the retroactive law, and the period before passage of the retroactive law was used only for 
purposes of computation; therefore, the law was not a retroactive application and did not apply to 
Engen. In contrast to the instant case, the obligation which Appellant seeks to avoid accrued 
before the enactment of the 2011 amendments. For Peterson, a period of time existed before 
passage of the retroactive law wherein she owed payment upon her court-ordered child support 
obligation but she failed to comply. Another period of time followed, still before the passage of 
the retroactive law, where Appellant arguably could not enforce the court-ordered child support 
obligation due to a statutory weakness. The 2011 amendments were intentionally retroactive as 
seen in the language of the Idaho 2011 Session Laws in order to remedy the specific situation 
presented in this case. 
Neither the Hidden Springs court nor its progenitor courts of Frisbie and Engen found 
either a vested right or an already existing right. Furthermore and most importantly, none of 
these cases dealt with the issue presented in this matter, namely a statute which was expressly 
made retroactive by the legislature. No rule arising from Hidden Springs, Frisbie, or Engen 
12 
would act to support Peterson's attempt to avoid paying the remaining balance of her support 
obligation. 
C. Peterson misapplies Idaho civil case law in her failed attempt to 
establish a vested right. 
Peterson continues misapplying additional Idaho case law to draw attention to other 
instances of the Court's use of the phrase "vested right." In an attempt to recognize the Court's 
acknowledgment of the phrase "vested right," Peterson cites where the "Legislature is entirely at 
liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right is disturbed" and the 
Legislature has power to "abolish rights that have not yet vested" Olsen v. J A. Freeman, 117 
Idaho 706, 719,791 P.2d 1285, 1298 (1990). In applying Olsen to the instant case, Peterson 
once again presumes that this Court recognizes a vested right in an expired statute of limitations. 
However, Hecla clearly shows that Peterson does not have a vested right to withhold financial 
support from a child during his minority. 
Moreover, the public policy supported in Stonecipher dictates that the Court should 
award arrearages on court-ordered child support obligations and enforce a parent's obligation to 
provide financial support to children during their minority. 131 Idaho at 737, 963 P.2d at 1173. 
As such, this Court should not, as a matter of public policy, recognize a vested right for an 
individual who failed to make a payment on a court-ordered child support obligation to avoid 
further enforcement of that obligation. 
Peterson further obscures Idaho case law with her reference to Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City 
of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968), for the notion that zoning ordinances 
provided the applicant of a building or use permit a vested right. 92 Idaho at 600-01, 448 P.2d at 
214-15. Ben Lomond involved a case where a property owner who actively applied for a 
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building permit and the municipality involved held the application for several months before 
taking action on it. 92 Idaho at 601, 448 P.2d at 215. 
Furthermore, to hold for the City in the present case would mean that a city, 
merely by withholding action on an application for a permit, could change or 
enact a zoning law to defeat the application. It could, in substance, give 
immediate effect to a future or proposed zoning ordinance before that ordinance 
was enacted by proper procedure. The present case effectively illustrates this 
possibility. 
Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595,602,448 P.2d 209,216 (1968). This case 
is easily distinguishable as the permit applicant actively took steps to apply for the permit; in 
contrast, Peterson passively ignored her obligation to make a payment on a court-ordered child 
support obligation. Furthermore, as in Engen this matter involved a property right, something 
which would be considered a vested right under Hecla as opposed to the claimed statute of 
limitations defense Peterson is seeking to hide behind which is not. 
Neither Olsen nor Ben Lombard provide any support for Peterson's claim to immunity 
from paying off the support obligation she did not meet during Erik's minority. The language 
relied upon from both cases is relevant only as it relates to a true vested right. However, as 
demonstrated in Hecla and Henderson this Court has previously stated that the legislature has the 
right and ability to revive a previously lapsed civil cause of action through subsequent legislation 
changing a statute of limitations. 
D. Peterson misplaces reliance upon the criminal case of 0 'Neill in 
her failed attempt to establish a vested right. 
Peterson ceases to even address civil law in citing the criminal case of State v. 0 'Neill 
118 Idaho 244, 796 P .2d 121 (1990) to address persuasive though not binding dicta regarding an 
alleged vested right in a statute oflimitations. 0 'Neill primarily addresses the issue of "whether 
a statute of limitation may be extended prior to the expiration of the original statute of limitations 
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without being violative of the ex post facto law provisions of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 0 'Neill at 246, 796 P.2d at 123. Peterson refers to the 0 'Neill court's citation of 
State of Washington v. Hodgson, 103 Wash.2d 662, 666, 740 P.2d 848, 850 (Wash. 1987), a 
Washington Supreme Court rape and indecent liberties case, which addresses the issue of 
whether "a legislative enactment extending a criminal statute of limitation appl[ies] to crimes 
committed before such enactment[.]" Id. Where the Washington Supreme Court held that "the 
legislative extensions of the statute of limitations did not violate the ex post facto prohibitions 
contained in our federal and state constitutions," Hodgson at 668-69, 740 P.2d at 852, the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Hodgson to similarly hold that its legislative extension 
of the statute of limitations did not violate constitutional ex post facto prohibitions. 0 'Neill at 
247, 796 P.2d at 124. While 0 'Neill is distinguishable from the instant case as a criminal rather 
than civil case and fails to address retroactivity, it keenly demonstrates the ability of a legislative 
body to extend a statute of limitations. 
E. Peterson continues to place inordinate emphasis upon persuasive 
foreign authority in her failed attempt to establish a vested right. 
While Peterson presents an interesting exposition on the terms "authoritative" and 
"binding," she curiously attempts to assert the use of persuasive authority in place of binding 
authority. Peterson places an inordinate amount of weight on the persuasive authority of a Utah 
case rather than on the binding authority of Idaho case law. 
In Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P. 2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a molestation victim was not entitled to rely upon a subsequently extended statute of 
limitations to file an action for sexual abuse suffered as a child. However, as previously 
discussed, and acknowledged by Peterson, Roark again did not involve an express statement of 
retroactivity and is thus readily distinguishable from the present case. 
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Peterson's reliance upon Roark may carry some persuasive weight, but it provides no 
binding authority and was decided based upon the laws of its own jurisdiction and on a factual 
record that does not compare with that presented in the instant case. Furthermore, Hecla and 
Henderson provide directly controlling Idaho precedent which runs counter to the analogy 
Peterson is trying to rely upon from Roark. This Court should continue to apply existing Idaho 
law and refrain from undue reliance upon the foreign authority referenced by Peterson. 
F. Peterson's disregard for established Idaho case law, 
misinterpretation and misapplication of Idaho case law, and errant 
assertions of persuasive rather than binding authority fail to 
establish a vested right in an expired statute of limitations. 
Peterson ignores the established Idaho case law which should be followed for its binding 
authority. The shelter of a statute of limitations is not a fundamental right. The expiration of a 
statute of limitations does not endow a vested property right in immunity from suit for unpaid 
child support obligations. And the Idaho Legislature does not lack authority to revive the 
expiration of a previously existing statute of limitations 
Peterson misinterprets and misapplies a litany of Idaho cases. Hidden Springs and its 
progenitors cannot demonstrate that Peterson possessed a vested right or an established right in 
withholding financial support from her child. A presumption that Olsen recognizes a vested 
right in an expired statute of limitations stands in opposition to the Hecla and Henderson which 
recognize the Legislature's authority to revive Peterson's obligation to financially support her 
child during his minority. 
A vested right acquired through actively taking steps as in Ben Lomond cannot be 
acquired through passively ignoring prevailing obligations, particularly where this Court has 
refused to accept that a vested right exists in an expired statute of limitations. And the criminal 
case of 0 'Neill actually promotes the proposition that the legislature possesses the ability to 
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extend a statute of limitations. Furthermore, Peterson errantly asserts the use of persuasive rather 
than binding authority with inordinate weight placed on a Utah case. The unpersuasive use of 
Roark should not be followed for the poor public policy promoted in the case, distinguishable 
factual context, and its lack of binding authority. 
Rather than accepting Peterson's misinterpreted and misapplied view of Idaho case law 
and Peterson's errant reliance upon an unpersuasive Utah case, this Court should honor the 
binding authority of established Idaho case law, which clearly demonstrates Peterson does NOT 
have a vested right resulting from an expired statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
On January 9, 1998, the Third District Court ordered Peterson to pay child support for 
Erik Peterson. Peterson failed to make a payment on her court-ordered child support obligation 
and now claims to possess a "vested right" in withholding financial support she owed for her son 
during his minority. 
Standard rules of statutory application support the magistrate court's original decision to 
renew the support judgment against Peterson. The district court's decision overturning the 
renewed judgment did not evaluate the 2011 amendments as a whole but rather in a piecemeal 
fashion. Furthermore, the district court's ruling thwarted the legislatures stated intent that the 
2011 amendments be applied retroactive to delinquent support obligors like Peterson. 
This Court has never recognized a "vested right" in withholding financial support from a 
child. To the contrary, public policy in Stonecipher dictated that the Court should award 
arrearages on court-ordered child support obligations to enforce a parent's obligation to provide 
financial support to children during their minority. The expiration of a statute of limitations does 
not endow a vested property right in immunity from suit for unpaid child support obligations of 
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any other civil liability and as a result the Legislature has the ability to revive an expired claim 
such as in Hecla and Henderson. 
This Court, under the authority of 2011 Idaho Session Law, should enforce Peterson's 
obligation to provide financial support to her child which became due during her child's minority 
by overturning the district court decision and reinstating the magistrate court renewal of 
Peterson's unpaid support obligation. As in Stonecipher, this Court should award arrearages on 
court-ordered child support obligations and enforce Peterson's obligation to payoff the 
delinquent financial support she owed for Erik as a matter of public policy. 
DATED this ___ day of October, 2013. 
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